

OUTSOURCING SEALIFT FOR THE MODULAR FORCE

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The end of the Cold War has introduced new strategic challenges and threats to our political and senior military leaders. As the U.S. Army transforms its force to modular, expeditionary brigade combat teams to compensate for these evolving challenges and threats, the importance of strategic sealift becomes paramount in terms of power projection. This essay addresses the effects of using the U.S. - flagged commercial shipping industry versus the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Fast Sealift Ship (FSS)/Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ship (LMSR) organic inventory to move unit equipment. Research focuses on the recently transformed 25th Infantry Division (ID) modular organization within U.S. Army Pacific Command in Oahu, Hawaii. The analysis centers on geography, the vessel selection process, two major 25th ID Hawaii-based unit deployments in 2006 and 2007 requiring outsourcing of strategic sealift, challenges facing the supported unit commander and Department of Defense (DoD) policy. Based upon this study, a proposal for procedural and policy adjustments are recommended due to shortfalls discovered in the strategic sealift selection process for 25th ID Hawaii-based modular forces.

OUTSOURCING SEALIFT FOR THE MODULAR FORCE

Strategic sealift is the maritime bridge to ensure that heavy ground forces are delivered and that all land-based forces are supported and resupplied in a conflict.

—Secretary of the Navy John Dalton 1994¹

The end of the Cold War has introduced new strategic challenges to our political and senior military leaders. These challenges have taken the form of protracted confrontations by state and non-state actors as they employ propaganda, threat, intimidation, overt violence and coercion to achieve their own political and ideological outcomes. With it comes the realization that persistent conflict is imminent. As the U.S. Army transforms its force to modular/expeditionary brigade combat teams (BCTs) to compensate for this evolving threat, the importance of strategic sealift becomes paramount in terms of power projection. More importantly, the ultimate decisions made regarding the type of sealift used to move the BCT can play significantly into the success or failure of a supported commander's deployment operations.

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) makes such decisions. Under its new charter established by the Secretary of Defense in February 1992, USTRANSCOM was labeled as the Department of Defense's (DoD's) single-manager for transportation, sustainment and distribution services to our nation's warfighters in both peace and war. But what does this really mean to the warfighter with regards to strategic sealift? In simplistic terms, it means that supported units provide requirements and required delivery dates (RDDs) to USTRANSCOM and its mission in turn is to determine the mode of transport and to deliver on time. In other words, the supported commander has little, if any, say in the type of vessel(s) selected in support of his/her

deployment. The old adage of “don’t tell us how to move it, just tell us what you want moved and we will get it there” comes to mind. But this mentality is not always the best approach for determining a sealift method for the BCT.

Modular forces can experience significant challenges when USTRANSCOM makes the decision to use the U.S. - flagged commercial shipping industry versus its own organic Military Sealift Command (MSC) Fast Sealift Ship (FSS)/Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ship (LMSR) inventory to move unit equipment. Leveraging the commercial industry to assist the DoD in the magnitude of supplies that it requires to move across the globe is certainly understood. Currently, USTRANSCOM relies on its commercial partners to meet 88 percent of continental U.S. land transport, 50 percent of global air movement, and 64 percent of global sealift.² But to totally disregard the MSC organic inventory in the selection process does not always provide the warfighter with the most cost efficient movement nor the one that would best support his/her operation in terms of meeting RDDs, maintaining asset visibility, or providing the ability to deploy cargo under training conditions with a mode of sealift it would use in a wartime scenario (the “train as you fight” concept).

For example, the LMSR has been the primary mover of U.S. military equipment during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in support of the global war on terrorism, moving a total of 32,095,817.77 square feet³ of military cargo since September 11, 2001. The LMSR was originally designed to carry an entire U.S. Army Task Force to include 58 tanks, 48 other tracked vehicles, as well as more than 900 trucks and other wheeled vehicles.⁴ Its carrying capacity was spotlighted in a congressionally-mandated Mobility Requirements Study of 1992 that

focused on DoD transportation during the first Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s. This study highlighted the urgent need for greater sealift capacity during wartime and other national contingencies. In response to the sealift shortfall, an ambitious strategic sealift acquisition program was introduced. Beginning in the late 1990s, the program added 19 LMSRs that provide five million square feet of sealift and afloat pre-positioning capacity.⁵ Yet, USTRANSCOM stands by a commercial first use policy in the selection of vessels for unit supported moves. Why?

To illustrate this problem, the research that follows will focus on the recently transformed 25th Infantry Division (ID) out of U.S. Army Pacific Command (USPACOM) in Oahu, Hawaii. Analysis centers on geography, USTRANSCOM's vessel selection process, two major 25th ID Hawaii-based unit deployments in 2006 and 2007 requiring outsourcing of strategic sealift, supported unit commander challenges and DoD policy. Based upon this study a conclusion will be drawn regarding the adequacy of current procedures for the selection of strategic sealift assets to support 25th ID Hawaii-based modular forces.

Background

The idea of modularity can be traced back over a decade. On 10 January 1995, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published TRADOC PAM 525-68, Concept for Modularity. At the time TRADOC argued that the security environment of the envisioned future was one that would require the Army to "deal with force strength constraints, limits on available forces, dollar constraints, and limits on strategic lift required to transport the necessary capability into theater."⁶ TRADOC was careful to define modularity as a force design methodology which would need to

establish a means of providing force elements that were interchangeable, expandable, and tailorable to meet the changing needs of the Army.

That need for modularity came to fruition during a 1999 deployment of Task Force (TF) Hawk to Kosovo and Albania. Reportedly, the TF consisted of various units from different divisions that had never trained together and was commanded by a command and control organization that was unable to conduct joint operations.⁷ The most often cited criticism was that it took more than 30 days to deploy TF Hawk from bases in Germany to Albania and when they finally arrived, they were unable to conduct combat operations due to training and equipment deficiencies.

Many experts consider the controversial TF Hawk deployment as the event that triggered Army transformation. Shortly after the debacle, in October 1999, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki introduced the Army's transformation strategy which was intended to convert all of the Army's divisions (called Legacy Forces) into new organizations called the Objective Force. General Shinseki's intent was to make the Army lighter, more modular, and more deployable. Initial strategic goals were to deploy a brigade in four days, a division in five days, and five divisions in 30 days. As part of this transformation, the Army adopted the Future Combat System (FCS) as a major acquisition program to equip the Objective Force.⁸ General Shinseki's vision was scheduled to take place over the course of three decades with the first FCS-equipped objective force becoming operational in 2011 and the entire force transformed by 2032.

In order to mitigate the risk associated with the Objective Force and to address the near-term need for more deployable and capable units, the Army's transformation

plan called for the development of brigade-sized units called the Interim Force in both the active Army and the Army National Guard. These six brigade sized units, known as both Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) or Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), are currently being fielded and serving in Iraq — with the last brigade due to be fielded in 2010.⁹ For three plus years General Shinseki fought the non-believers of his vision promoting the FCS to Congress and the DoD leadership. On 14 May 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved the FCS' next acquisition phase granting Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation the authorization to award contracts to 21 companies to design and build its various platforms and hardware and software.

But in August 2003, the newly designated CSA, General Peter Schoomaker, changed the Army's transformation plan. General Schoomaker redesignated the Objective Force as the Future Force, emphasizing the fielding of useful FCS program capabilities as soon as they became available instead of waiting a decade or more before they could be integrated into other FCS platforms and technologies under development.¹⁰ This change prompted immediate and more expedient modular conversions across the Army.

The modular conversions have enabled the Army to generate force packages optimized to meet the demands of a particular situation in a combatant commander's AO, without the overhead and support previously provided by higher commands. These units, known as Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), are more robust, require less augmentation and are standardized in design to increase interoperability and

deployability. They are, in essence, a self-sufficient, stand-alone tactical force, consisting of 3,500 to 4,000 Soldiers, that is organized and trains the way it fights.

There are three common organizational designs for ground BCTs and five for support brigades. The three types of combat brigades consist of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs), Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs include air assault and airborne units), and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). Four of the five types of support brigades perform a single function each: aviation; fires; sustain; and battlefield surveillance. The fifth, maneuver enhancement brigade, is organized around a versatile core of supporting units that provide engineer, military police, air defense, chemical and signal capabilities.¹¹

One of the Army's four overarching strategies, the provision of relevant and ready landpower, specifies its objective to transform and modernize through fielding an active and reserve component pool of 76 modular BCTs and approximately 225 support brigades.¹² Such a modular transformation recently occurred in the 25th ID (Light) from 2005-2007. A rapid strike force of nearly 17,000 Soldiers, the newly transformed 25th ID is composed of four BCTs (two in Hawaii and two in Alaska), the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) and a headquarters. The 25th ID current organizational chart is depicted in the diagram below (Figure 1).




Figure 1 – 25th ID Organization (as of 17 August 2007)¹³

It is important to note that the Sustainment and Maneuver Enhanced Brigade units (45th Sustainment Brigade and 8th Military Police) are not shown because they now belong to the 8th Theater Sustainment Command.

Geography

The strategic importance of basing military assets in Hawaii can not be overemphasized. The hub of the Pacific region and home of USPACOM headquarters, the Island of Oahu has been and continues to be vital to the global interests of the U.S. since establishing its roots there in 1898. Since the end of the Cold War joint forces have remained engaged throughout the Asia-Pacific region providing trained and ready active and reserve forces and playing a key role in the USPACOM theater security cooperation programs. However, based upon Oahu's geographic location and size, Army modular forces stationed there are reliant on strategic sealift in order to sustain collective training in preparation for real-world deployment.

The island of Oahu's training areas are managed by U.S. Army Garrison-Hawaii (USAG-HI). USAG-HI consists of two major installations—Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter, and 25 smaller installations covering a total of 167,919 acres¹⁴ on two islands. Schofield Barracks is the home of the 25th ID who depends on the Garrison's training lands to fulfill its military and training objectives. The 25th ID's training encompasses mounted and dismounted maneuver, reconnaissance training, live-fire training, deployment training, aviation training, combined live-fire/maneuver, force on force training and service support operations.

But the 25th's ability to train at levels larger than the battalion sized task force is extremely limited. Even though the majority of Oahu and Schofield training areas are not restricted by use agreements and exercises can be conducted seven days a week, the major constraint is in the insufficient size of the complex. Live-fire and artillery operations are the most hampered. Ideally, the impact area should be considerably larger with the ranges spread much further apart. The maximum firing distance is

approximately five kilometers which is well below the maximum range of most artillery weapons. Because of the lack of maneuver space, the artillery pieces are positioned in a few firing points repeatedly. Additionally, the ranges and firing position safety zones overlap to such an extent that many ranges cannot be used simultaneously and environmental, cultural and religious restrictions hinder large scale training events.¹⁵

The lack and inadequacy of USAG-HI training facilities became clearly evident in early 2004 when the Division deployed over 10,000 Soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan. Units were competing for the need of training areas and resources that simply did not exist on the island. Opportunities existed to conduct operations on the neighboring island of Hawaii (Big Island) where the Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA) was located, but in order to move equipment and Soldiers to conduct such training required time, money and resources. Additionally, Logistics Support Vessels (LSVs) and commercial sealift assets historically utilized to move units to PTA (163rd Transportation Detachment and Young Brother's Barge Company¹⁶) did not have the depth in inventory of LSVs nor barges to support simultaneous or large unit moves there. PTA's outdated infrastructure and facilities are programmed for renovation and modernization under military construction (MILCON) projects, but not for several years.

Additionally, the transformation of the 2BCT into a SBCT in 2006 has had a significant impact on both Oahu and the Big Island training areas. The SBCT has brought 800 additional Soldiers and about 300 more tactical vehicles to the state. There are 28 construction projects tied to the SBCT, including several range complexes at Schofield Barracks and PTA on the Big Island. The new ranges are designed to facilitate the type of training the SBCT will need to conduct. But due to environmental

court battles¹⁷ with Native Hawaiian environmental groups over the past few years, many doubt that Hawaii will ever possess adequate training facilities to meet collective training requirements any time soon, if ever at all.

Therefore, rotations to combat training centers such as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA and National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA have and will continue to provide paramount training opportunities for the 25th ID. Notably, NTC has been and continues to be the premier training venue for brigade sized task forces preparing for war (and now newly transformed BCTs preparing for deployment in support of OEF and OIF). And for Hawaii based modular forces, this signifies the invariable need for strategic sealift.

Vessel Selection

The movement of cargo by strategic sealift is provided and managed by two of USTRANSCOM's component commands, the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). Four programs comprise Military Sealift Command: Sealift, Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), Special Mission, and Prepositioning. The Sealift program provides the bulk of the MSC's supply-carrying operation and operates tankers for fuel transport and dry-cargo ships that transport equipment, vehicles, helicopters, ammunition, and supplies.¹⁸

The mission of the Sealift program is to provide ocean transportation to the DoD by meeting its sealift requirements in peace, contingency, and war with quality, efficient cost effective assets and centralized management. This is achieved through the use of commercial charter vessels, large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, fast sealift ships, and the Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force.¹⁹


The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, (SDDC), located in Alexandria, Virginia, with its Operations Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, is the overland lift component and primary surface distribution manager for USTRANSCOM. SDDC is responsible for surface transportation of U.S. forces on a global basis and is the interface between DoD shippers and the commercial carrier industry. SDDC has a presence in 24 water ports worldwide²⁰ with the 599th Transportation Group providing support to the 25th ID in Hawaii.

USTRANSCOM and component commands involved in the selection of vessels for the warfighter follow a USTRANSCOM Vessel Selection Policy Directive that covers standard operating procedures (SOPs) for surge sealift and commercial vessel selection. This directive enables the MSC and SDDC Transportation Component Commands (TCCs) to recommend available sealift courses of action (COAs) so that USTRANSCOM can select vessels for the movement of the supported unit's cargo. The directive references fifteen DoD regulations and policy directives to include the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).²¹ Because enrollment of carriers in the VISA program provides the DoD with assured access to sealift services during contingencies based on a level of commitment, as well as a mechanism for joint planning, the DoD awards peacetime cargo contracts to VISA participants on a priority basis. This applies to liner trades and charter contracts alike.²²

The Vessel Selection Directive also states that the USTRANSCOM J3 and TCCs shall make every endeavor to satisfy DoD strategic sealift surge and sustainment requirements using U.S. flag, commercial resources in the following priority: first to commercial vessels already under charter to the United States; then to vessels in

regularly scheduled commercial service in accordance with VISA priorities; then to vessels available for charter hire in accordance with VISA priorities. It provides both MSC and SDDC explicit guidance relating to their operating procedures and vessel selection criteria (to include cargo requirements and vessel considerations). The USTRANSCOM Surface Business Model in figure 2 below describes the process.

Surface Business Model



Acronyms

COC	Command Operations Center
DEL	Deployment Equipment List
HAZMAT	Hazardous Material
MSC	Military Sealift Command
OTO	One Time Only
SDDC	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
RFP	Request For Proposal
TCCC	Commander, United States Transportation Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

Figure 2, USTRANSCOM Surface Business Model

Though the directive makes it clear to TCCs that “nothing within the SOP shall be construed to bind the decision maker from obligation to exercise independent professional judgment.”²³, the model clearly demonstrates that commercial liner feasibility is looked at first and foremost.

Major Deployments (NTC 2006/NTC 2007)

The 25th ID Hawaii-based units have conducted two NTC rotations since completion of transformation to the modular construct. The first occurred in June of 2006 that required strategic sealift for a command and control (C2) element of the 25th ID headquarters, the 3rd IBC, 25th CAB, 45th Sustainment Brigade (-) and one battalion from the 2nd BCT who were to serve as Observer Controllers (OCs) for the exercise. The second rotation was just recently completed in September of 2007 and included movement of the 2nd BCT in order for them to meet full operational capability (FOC) as part of their final stages of transformation and complete conversion to a Stryker BCT.

Scheduled training for the 2006 rotation took place 24 April 07 through 24 May 07. The task force deployment consisted of approximately 1,680 pieces of equipment requiring over 240,000 square feet of vessel space. Based on the estimated square footage and deployment of 58 CAB helicopters planned for in the scenario (4x CH-47, 24 x UH-60 and 30 x OH-58), the 25th ID requested a “gray hull” (LMSR) vessel for the move three months before execution. The 25th ID Division Transportation Officer (DTO) staff determined that all the cargo would fit on one vessel if SDDC selected this as a mode of sealift. The DTO provided initial estimates to SDDC in February 06 and after several days was notified that though they understood the unit wanted a “gray hull” solution, other COAs were being considered (see figure 3). This raised great concern

among 25th ID planners (specifically G3 PLEX, G4 DTO and G8) due to the fact that the Division was working within a constrained budget of no more than 6 million dollars for NTC transportation round trip costs.²⁴

COA	Vessel Strategy	Vessel(s) Planned	Unit Preference
COA-1	Commercial RORO Solution	MV JEAN ANNE for helos and MV GREAT LAND for remainder of cargo	2nd Most Preferred
COA -2	Combination Commercial RORO/Door to Door Solution	MV JEAN ANNE CAB cargo (helos and cargo) & various other MVs for remainder of 25th ID cargo containerized	Least Preferred
COA-3	Pure Organic Solution with 1 x LMSR	LMSR (Bob Hope Class) for all cargo	Most Preferred

Figure 3, COA Development for NTC Rotation 2006

The events that transpired from that point forward provided challenges beyond comprehension in regards to the sealift portion of this move. To gain an appreciation for the unit's frustration, a timeline synopsis is provided in Figure 4 below.

Date	Event
1 Mar 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SDDC Rep attends NTC Rock Drill and informs 25th ID DTO that they were seeking commercial industry to move cargo. Plan was to move the CAB (due to helo requirements) on the PASHA vessel (MV JEAN ANNE) and remaining cargo on the MV GREAT LAND. - DTO raised the concern of whether the CH-47s would fit on the PASHA vessel/SDDC felt confident this would not be an issue. - G4 raised that this avenue would require an additional vessel and voiced concern over additional expense based on the NTC budget constraints.....and no red flags were raised on money. It was explained that due to the fact that the unit would be paying for space.....the additional vessels involved should not cause a significant increase in cost.
2 Mar 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It was determined that communications architecture and 2BCT containers needed to get to NTC early to set the conditions for the exercise (a third vessel requirement due to an earlier available load date (ALD) and latest arrival date (LAD) requirement versus the other cargo).
15 Mar 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DTO informs the CDRS, staff and CG at NTC IPR that SDDC relayed that there would be 3 vessels involved in this move. The MV GREAT LAND (3IBCT, 524 CSB, remaining TF units), the MV JEAN ANNE (CAB), and a third vessel TBD for about 69 pieces of cargo (comms/2BCT early arrival). - SDDC revealed they were having problems determining if CABs 4 x CH-47s would fit on the JEAN ANNE. This was briefed as an issue that needed resolution. It was also discussed at this IPR that due to multiple ships, whether or not this would increase projected costs. G4 informed the COS that the staff would push to get final estimates from SDDC.
17 Mar 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 599th SDDC reps at Hawaii set up a teleconference based on IPR concerns with SDDC at Fort

	<p>Eustis. Synopsis follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SDDC at Fort Eustis stated total cost of the vessels and line haul ROUND TRIP could exceed <u>\$10,000,000</u> (25th ID programmed into the budget <u>aprox. \$5,700,000</u> to cover these costs). 2. 25th ID could expect an accurate price analysis based on the new unit deployment lists (UDLs) for each vessel on <u>Monday 20 Mar 06</u> from SDDC. 3. The commercial carrier Matson had received schematics on the CH-47D and should have an answer NLT 18 March as to the A/C fitting through the hatches on the MAHI MAHI or the MATSONIA (exploring options of a 4th vessel). 4. All equipment that could be containerized would be done at the SPOE to expedite the line haul process from the SPOD to NTC.
17 Mar 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - G4 sent a message to SDDC Ops Chief at Eustis and informed him of the results of the VTC emphasizing the Division's surprise (to put it mildly) of the estimated price tag provideddouble the cost that had been programmed. - G4 also explained that the movement issues associated with the 4 x CH-47s was still unresolved and that SDDC was trying to figure out how to move them. - G4 additionally, questioned why the request for a "gray hull" (LMSR) chartered vessel to move equipment was not still being considered because it would have to be more cost efficient than 10 million dollars associated with putting the cargo against commercial vessels.
21 Mar 06	- ITO and DTO notified by MSC that a chartered LMSR from the Gulf coast would be available for this mission (all cargo on one vessel) for \$2.8 million dollars for deployment (roughly \$5.6M round trip). MSC also reported that SDDC had not offered the cargo and if this option was to be available then a decision would have to be made in 48 hours to ensure the LMSR could meet required ALDs.
21 Mar 06	- ITO received notification from USPACOM through JOPEs Newsgroup that cost for deployment only using commercial industry would be 9.1 million dollars (over 18 million dollars round trip).
22 Mar 06	- COS received traffic from USTRANSCOM J3, that USTRANSCOM planners to include J8 (for billing) and J5 (commercial policy) were trying to determine a more affordable solution to 25 th ID sealift requirements for NTC.
23 Mar 06	- USTRANSCOM J3 comes back to the COS via SIPR with a new cost estimate of 14.2 million dollars for sealift. USTRANSCOM also stated that the JOPEs data they were looking at was not in concert with UDLs and asked that we engage USARPAC and USPACOM to ensure they had inputted JOPEs data based off the latest UDLs.
24 Mar 06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Window of opportunity for use of USNS BOB HOPE (single gray hull LMSR option) rapidly closing. - USTRANSCOM informs 25th ID that LMSR option is not doable based on DoD commercial first policy. - COS responds back to USTRANSCOM that 25th ID would fund the \$14.2 million. - G4 directed all BN UMOs to report to the DTC to verify UDLs were accurate. DTC worked through the evening and pushed final UDLs to USARPAC on 250545 MAR 06 HST.
26 Mar 06	- ITO reports that USARPAC has updated JOPEs and USPACOM has validated cargo in JOPEs.
28 Mar 06	- SDDC informs 25 th ID that the PASHA vessel (MV JEAN ANNE) that they have been working for the past several weeks will have to discharge cargo at San Diego versus Long Beach (as CAB had been planning for months). All CAB cargo would now have an SPOD of Long Beach NOT San Diego in the TPFDD.

	- Additionally, SDDC informs the DTO that the MV GREAT LAND was still in dry dock and was no longer available for this move.....so this would now require placing all remaining cargo that the JEAN ANNE can't handle on 3 x additional MATSON vessels (MAHI MAHI, MATSONIA, and LURLIN.....all door to door moves).
28 Mar 06	- G4 conducts meeting with DCG-S to discuss impacts due to changes. - G4 contacts SDDC Ops center at Fort Eustis and informed them of issues with the PASHA vessel JEAN ANNE discharging equipment at San Diego versus Long Beach. SDDC at Eustis was aware but had no information on any action taken.
29 Mar 06	- DCG-S conducts office call with 599 th SDDC and they inform him that SDDC Ops center out of Eustis contacted PASHA and JEAN ANNE will not agree to conduct discharge operations at Long Beach. - DCG-S directs DTO/ITO to work plans for JEAN ANNE to conduct SPOD ops at San Diego and proceed.

Figure 4, NTC 2006 Timeline²⁵

As depicted in the timeline, SDDC made the initial decision to go with COA-1 (Commercial RORO Solution) later changing the mode of shipment to COA-2 (Combination Commercial RORO/Door to Door Solution) due to unavailability of the MV GREAT LAND. This was done even though the 25th ID had requested COA-3 (Pure Organic Solution with 1 x LMSR) as the most preferred method of sealift throughout the planning process. The Division cited several reasons for preferring COA-3 over the other sourcing solutions:

1) this method would be least expensive based upon a very constrained budget for the exercise

2) the fact that oversized cargo would create problems for a commercial carrier (specifically CH-47 aft height restrictions²⁶ and undercarriage clearance in loading operations of CH-47s)

3) the loss of unit integrity and visibility would be to a much lesser degree enabling better C2 during deployment and redeployment operations

4) the port challenges faced by the unit and Pearl Harbor staff would be reduced (COA-1 and COA-2 would require simultaneous loading operations and/or require the Division to allocate space for container stuffing operations)

Nevertheless, TRANSCOM ultimately made the final decision to go with COA-2 to execute the movement. SDDC did explore the availability of using an LMSR to support the move once engaged by the senior leadership of the Division. However, USTRANSCOM responded that under stipulations of the Cargo Preference Act²⁷, this situation did not warrant the use of an MSC vessel in a commercial trade route.

In the end, the rotation utilized six commercial vessels for the deployment (MV LURLINE, MV MATSONIA, MV KAUAI, MV MAHI-MAHI, MV MATSONIA (#4), MV JEAN ANNE) and ended up costing in excess of 14 million dollars to execute. More importantly, two of the four CH-47s shipped failed to meet the required delivery date (RDD) never entering into the “maneuver box.” The unit simply ran out of time in the reconfiguration and test phases at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD) in San Diego to deploy them into the scenario. Also worth noting was the sealift option chosen for the 25th ID's return trip home from NTC. The unit redeployed utilizing the MV JEAN ANNE for CAB's helos and equipment and the USNS GORDON (Smaller Gordon Class LMSR) for the remainder of the 25th ID cargo.

Based off the lessons learned from the 2006 NTC rotation there was much more involvement and emphasis placed on the rotation in 2007 on the part of USTRANSCOM, USPACOM and USARPAC staffs. The task force deployment for this rotation consisted of approximately 2,200 pieces of equipment requiring over 301,000 square feet of vessel space.

SDDC explored three (3) COAs for the 2007 movement (see figure 5 below):

COA	Vessel Strategy	Vessel(s) Planned	Risk	Cost
COA -1	Commercial RORO/Door to Door Solution	JEAN ANNE MATSONIA NAVIGATOR	Acceptable Risk	\$8.4M
COA-2	Combination Commercial/Organic Solution with Commercial RORO and LMSR	JEAN ANNE LMSR (Watson)	Low Risk	\$8.8M
COA-3	Pure Organic Solution with RRF RORO and LMSR	LMSR (Watson) RRF RORO	Most Flexible	\$7.8M

Figure 5, COA Development for NTC Rotation 2007²⁸

For COA -1 (Commercial RORO/Door to Door Solution), SDDC performed preliminary vessel pre-stow plans to establish feasibility of a three commercial vessel solution consisting of a commercial RORO ship and two commercial container ships. This COA planned for the JEAN ANNE to load pre-positioned cargo from Pearl Harbor and use San Diego as their SPOD. Horizon and Matson would perform container stuffing operations at Schofield Barracks beginning 23 Jul 07 and use Los Angeles as their SPOD. SDDC deemed this course of action as acceptable with moderate risk. The COA also supported USTRANSCOM's perception of an OSD commercial first policy, USTRANSCOM's desire to exercise its VISA container carriers in a surge environment and SDDC's desire to execute a door to door deployment. Industry would have eight days to conduct onward movement and have to set a goal of pushing 100 commercial trucks out of the port each day. Fort Irwin would need to be prepared to receive the conveyance and unload efficiently in order to recycle trucks daily. In order to meet mission requirements, SDDC determined this COA would have to be intensely managed.

COA-2 (Combination Commercial/Organic Solution with Commercial RORO and LMSR) involved the use of one LMSR (Watson Class) and one commercial RORO ship

with a seaport of embarkation (SPOE) of Pearl Harbor and SPOD of San Diego for both vessels. For the LMSR portion of the move SDDC would execute the load, discharge and inland movement and the ITO at Schofield Barracks would be responsible to have cargo at the SPOE as specified in the port call message. It was estimated that this type of LMSR could carry 260,000 sq ft of the total requirement and that the JEAN ANNE vessel would carry the remaining cargo. This course of action was estimated at a low risk as it would eliminate the excess handling of the cargo due to having no requirement for flat rack or containerization operations. SDDC also determined that it would eliminate any opportunity to exercise the use of VISA partners in a surge like environment and not support the commercial first policy. Additionally, a majority of the onward movement would be conducted by the 834th Terminal Battalion for the LMSR cargo. This created some concerns due to the LMSR schedule allowing only six days to conduct onward movement for the 1500+ pieces of cargo on the LMSR.

COA-3 (Pure Organic Solution with RRF RORO and LMSR) explored the use of one LMSR (Watson Class) and one RRF RORO ship (Cape H Class) with a SPOE of Pearl Harbor and SPOD of San Diego for both vessels. SDDC would execute the load, discharge and inland move for both vessels. The LMSR could carry 250,000 sq ft of the total requirement and the Cape H would carry the remaining cargo. SDDC determined that this course of action would provide the most flexibility with two organic RORO vessels. The bulk of the mission success or failure would be on the 834th Terminal Battalion to perform a timely and efficient onward movement of the cargo from San Diego to Fort Irwin. Onward movement would be limited to eight days for the Cape H

and just six days for the LMSR with 250,000 square feet of cargo. This COA was estimated as the biggest challenge for one of SDDC's best Terminal Battalions.

SDDC recommended COA-1 (Commercial RORO/Door to Door Solution) as the most feasible even though more expensive than a pure organic solution. Reasoning provided for their recommendation rested on the premise that COA-2 (Combination Commercial/Organic Solution with Commercial RORO and LMSR) and COA-3 (Pure Organic Solution with RRF RORO and LMSR) were not consistent with sealift policy. SDDC also cited VISA partnership and support of future commercial door to door deployments as reasons for supporting this COA.

However, USTRANSCOM ultimately made the decision to execute COA-2 over SDDC's recommendation to execute COA-1 for the NTC deployment because it offered a lesser degree of risk and due to Stryker vehicle considerations. They wanted to load Stryker vehicles on one vessel which would afford the opportunity to discharge at one SPOD. But as described earlier, this COA was neither the most cost efficient nor the preferred method of sealift for the supported unit.

For the redeployment, USTRANSCOM moved 723 pieces of cargo back to Hawaii on three commercial vessels (MV JEAN ANNE, MV MATSONIA, and MV MANUKAI). The majority of the Stryker BCT's equipment consisting of 1,403 pieces was deployed from California directly to OIF on the USNS BRITTEN (Bob Hope Class LMSR). Using commercial carriers for the Hawaii bound cargo was virtually the only option based on the limited vessel space required since a majority of the equipment was required to be shipped to Southwest Asia for the BCT's upcoming OIF rotation. But the

unit still faced the same challenges in preparing cargo for the commercial door-to-door shipments out of California as they did from Hawaii.

In retrospect, the 2007 deployment to NTC was reminiscent of many of the same problems experienced by the 25th ID in 2006. Cost efficiencies and unit preferences once again failed to trump USTRANSCOM's reliance to make decisions based on sealift policy, VISA partnership and support of future commercial door to door deployments.

Supported Unit Challenges

Based upon transformation, the changes to the Division modified table of organization and equipment (MTO&E) in the Division G4 drastically reduced its capability to perform functions previously performed by the DTO shop. The intent of the new modular concept was to allow most of the transportation management functions to reside in the BCT with the addition of a mobility warrant officer and increased capability within the SPO sections of the supporting Brigade Support Battalions (BSBs). However, at the time of the 2006 rotation neither 3IBCT nor the CAB had yet received a full complement of these capabilities. The 25th ID DTO was also “dual hatted” and served not only as the Division’s transportation officer but also as the U.S. Army Hawaii (USARHAW) transportation officer. During the planning of the 2006 NTC rotation the DTO was heavily engaged in other USARHAW activities involving hurricane relief operations and OIF deployments for the 84th Engineer Battalion. This was unique to 25th ID because other installations either have a Corps Transportation Officer or the ITO managing transportation requirements outside the Division.

Balancing the commander's training goals and intent within a fixed and tightly controlled transportation budget was also problematic. Original estimates for the NTC

exercise were based on a BCT-sized rotation consisting of approximately 3,500 Soldiers. The decision to include a majority of the CAB and a portion of the 45th Sustainment Brigade in the exercise due to the training opportunity for their future OIF deployment increased the size of the rotation to about 5,000 and markedly increased the cargo square footage requirements for sealift.

For the NTC Rotation in 2006, once the decision was made to go with COA-2 (Combination Commercial RORO/Door to Door Solution) very late in the planning process, the challenges for the supported unit were tremendous. Convoys that had gone through the Deployment Training Center (DTC) joint inspection (JI) process for movement on the GREAT LAND and JEAN ANNE had to be restaged in unit motor pools (some actually even redirected hours before crossing start points (SPs) to the port). Vehicles previously cleared for hazardous material (HAZMAT) standards now had to have all HAZMAT removed and segregated away from the vehicle.²⁹ The DTO staff had to expeditiously work with unit movement officers (UMOs) to recreate unit deployment lists (UDLs) and load planning data due to the change in the types of vessels originally planned. The G4 and DTO also had to work with the G3 to reconstruct the movement order changing all previously planned serials for movement to port as well as coordinate with 2BCT and other units on Schofield Barracks for motor pool space to make enough room for container stuffing and flat rack operations required by the commercial shipping industry.

The biggest effect this had on the deploying unit involved the changing of the MV JEAN ANNE SPOD from Long Beach to San Diego. This singular event caused the most consternation and coordination. This forced the CAB to have to expeditiously

coordinate for TDY orders to commercially fly 168 mechanics and pilots to San Diego in order to conduct port operations there. The short fuse requirement precluded billeting at a single hotel necessitating the dispersion of the port opening detachment across three hotels. The CAB had made arrangements with the Naval Activity at Long Beach for life support and tools to conduct operations at that port per the original plan. Now that the port was moved to San Diego, complete adjustments in flights and life support had to be contracted. It also required the USARHAW ITO to organize bus transportation schedules to accommodate the movement of personnel to and from the San Diego airport and hotel, to and from the hotels to the port for helo download and rebuild operations and to and from San Diego port as operations concluded.

The 2007 NTC rotation provided the unit with similar challenges experienced in 2006. Using commercial carriers causes the supported unit to have to do a tremendous amount of administrative work to prepare Export Traffic Release Requests (ETRRs)³⁰ and commercial bookings. Additionally, just as in 2006, the handling of cargo during stuffing / de-stuffing operations increased the risk of missing required delivery dates (RDDs) and caused damage to unit cargo that more than likely would not have occurred if an MSC organic vessel option had been used.

From the port's perspective, Fleet Industrial and Supply Center (FISC), Pearl Harbor³¹ reported that whenever moves involve multiple vessels, it becomes taxing on their port operators and staff. In the 2006 case, because the plan had changed multiple times and UDLs were continuously changed based on sizing restrictions and vehicle to vessel changes, it caused FISC to divert labor resources to work on booking, documenting, and coordinating movement throughout the movement period.

Additionally, when the commercial move entails cargo movement to the commercial port (as with the commercial door-to-door in the 2006 NTC example), FISC loses visibility, and therefore cannot, with certainty, ensure cargo is on the right vessel headed to the intended port. Loading MSC vessels, especially LMSRs, has proven to be more effective because unit and port personnel can typically load everything to one vessel, which reduces the chance of error and increases efficiencies in load and discharge operations. The major problem from FISC's point of view comes about when there is a mixture of commercial loading at the commercial port along with FISC loading operations at Pearl Harbor. Historically, this is where FISC has consistently encountered problems with booking, documentation, tracking, and coordination.³²

Policy Considerations

USTRANSCOM and TCCs follow DoD policy when making decisions regarding strategic sealift for supported forces. As pointed out earlier, USTRANSCOM places priority on a commercial first use policy in the vessel election process. They cite DoD Directive 4500.9E in support of this business rule. DoD Directive 4500.9E prescribes general DoD transportation and traffic management policies. It states that "DoD transportation requirements shall be met by using the most cost effective commercial transportation resources to the maximum extent practicable unless there is a documented negative critical mission impact. In peacetime, the DoD generally shall maintain and operate only those owned or controlled transportation resources needed to meet approved DoD emergency and wartime requirements and anticipated exercise or other peacetime forecast requirements that may not reasonably be met with commercial transportation resources. DoD-owned or -controlled transportation

resources shall be used during peacetime as efficiently as practicable, to provide essential training for operational personnel, and to ensure the capability to meet approved requirements for military capacity in wartime, contingencies, and emergencies.”³³

However, a very recent DoD Inspector General (IG) report audit conducted on USTRANSCOM’s compliance with DoD policy of sealift focused on such a policy. IG Report Number D-2007-105, dated 21 June 2007, was initiated based upon allegations that USTRANSCOM had not used the most optimal and cost effective sealift method for the NTC rotation in support of the 25th ID in 2006. This audit found that the USTRANSCOM vessel selection process model was inconsistent with DoD interim guidance on the use of commercial transportation. Specifically, the IG report determined that the USTRANSCOM business model was not requiring an evaluation of all sealift options, and that when multiple options existed, it wasn’t requiring either a cost analysis or business case analysis.³⁴ It concluded that as a result, the warfighter may not be obtaining the optimum and most cost effective sealift logistics option.

The IG report focused on four policy directives covering sealift transportation criteria: National Security Directive 28; DOD Directive 4500.9E; OSD Interim Guidance for Implementation of Sealift Policy; and the Commander of USTRANSCOM’s Vessel Selection Process memorandum. The audit concluded that though both National Security Directive 28 and DoD Directive 4500.9E require DoD to use the commercial sector for sealift transportation to the maximum extent practical, that should be the case when and only when the commercial sector can meet DoD operational requirements. The OSD Interim Guidance and USTRANSCOM Vessel Selection Process

memorandum also require DoD to use commercial sealift transportation resources whenever practical. However, both of these documents require personnel to evaluate all sealift options and use either a cost analysis or business case analysis when multiple sealift options exist.³⁵

Conclusion

The preceding analysis reinforces that procedures and policies used for the selection of strategic sealift assets to support 25th ID Hawaii-based modular BCTs are situationally deficient. Future decisions to outsource sealift commercially for 25th ID BCT sized or larger moves must consider the burden being placed on the supported unit and potential cost savings that stand to be lost by the DoD. This research has provided significant data that supports the use of MSC organic assets such as the LMSR over commercial door-to-door carriers to support future Hawaiian BCT moves. The conclusion was obtained based upon Oahu geographical constraints, shortcomings in USTRANSCOM's vessel selection process, lessons learned from the last two major 25th ID Hawaii-based NTC deployments in 2006 and 2007, supported unit commander challenges and current DoD policy.

Oahu's geographic location and the limited space available in training acreage makes strategic sealift an absolute necessity for 25th ID modular forces. Training area limitations have increased even more due to transformational additions of the Stryker BCT and overall growth of the 25th ID in personnel and vehicle densities. In order for the Hawaii based BCT unit to accomplish effective collective training in preparation for war, it has to move off the islands. This requires continued deployments to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) in the continental U.S. and would best be supported by an

MSC organic vessel such as the LMSR. The LMSR was built to offset the shortage of militarily useful cargo ships available in the commercial sector - a growing concern as a result of Operation Desert Storm and for U.S. forces overseas such as the 25th ID who depend on power projection by sea. LMSRs continue to be the primary movers of U.S. military equipment during OIF and OEF moving over 32,000,000 square feet of military cargo since September 11, 2001. The NTC is noted as the closest thing to a full dress rehearsal for combat that a BCT sized unit will ever encounter. During major collective training exercises such as rotations to the NTC, it only stands to reason to provide the BCT the capability to train on the equipment they would deploy to combat with by sea, the LMSR. Forcing the BCT to make these moves commercially denies a unique opportunity to conduct that full dress rehearsal and to train as it would fight in a wartime scenario.

The DoD and USTRANSCOM will continue to dictate policy and make the ultimate decisions on the type of sealift selected in support of BCT movements. However, before choosing a commercial option their vessel selection policy must not only continue to consider but heavily weigh unit apprehensions relating to over and outsized cargo restrictions, the problems associated with disassembling helicopters below standard sealift configuration, the importance of maintaining unit integrity in order to gain better asset visibility and meet LADs, and the inherent risks associated with containerizing cargo.

Commercial sealift sourcing solutions chosen for the past two 25th ID NTC rotations have proven not only to be a burden and significant challenge for the supported unit commander but were also documented not to be the most cost effective

method of sealift that was available at the time. The 2006 NTC move cost the Division in excess of 14 million dollars, well over double the cost that an MSC organic vessel solution would have cost. The comparison of these two NTC rotations clearly demonstrated that USTRANSCOM has the capability to provide MSC organic options and solutions to the warfighter. These options were used during the NTC redeployment for 2006 and deployment for 2007. Both proved much more cost effective and successful based off unit after action review (AAR) comments than the commercial door-to-door solutions used in the same two rotations for deployment in 2006 and redeployment in 2007.

Both the supported unit and FISC at Pearl Harbor favor the MSC organic vessel option over a commercial door to door sealift solution. Unit challenges identified during commercial outsourcing ranged from the problems and inherent risks associated with container stuffing and flat rack operations, the amount of administrative work required to complete ETRRs, the problems of maintaining total asset visibility, and the varying degrees of HAZMAT shipping procedures and documentation required by the commercial shipping industry. FISC pointed out the problems they had encountered during simultaneous commercial loading at the commercial port and FISC loading at Pearl Harbor. During such occurrences FISC noted consistent problems with booking, documentation, tracking, and coordination that were not experienced during moves involving the exclusive use of MSC organic vessel(s).

The June 2007 DoD IG Audit conducted for the 2006 NTC rotation also exhibits a problem regarding USTRANSCOM's interpretation of DoD policy on the use of commercial sealift. The audit found that USTRANSCOM's Vessel Selection SOP does

have provisions for the consideration of all sealift options IAW with DoD policy. However, it also revealed that USTRANSCOM's surface business model for selecting vessels was inconsistent with DoD guidance and policy. The model does not require TCC personnel to consider the use of activated Government-owned and chartered commercial vessels before selecting other sealift options. As of this report, USTRANSCOM's model is dated 31 May 2007 and still reflects a commercial first use policy in their business flow chart. Once USTRANSCOM changes this process, it will allow MSC organic solutions to be explored in all moves and presented to the unit as a potential COA for strategic sealift.

In closing, the importance of maintaining solid partnerships and strong relationships with the commercial industry to assist DoD in the movement of cargo is essential. Policy and laws such as the Jones Act³⁶, Cargo Preference Act, DoD Directive 4500.9E and VISA protect U.S.-flagged carriers and promote needed relations and services with the commercial sector. This is understood. Based upon the global war on terrorism that our nation currently faces and the available MSC organic sealift inventory, USTRANSCOM simply could not move the amount of cargo required to support wartime and peacetime efforts without the commercial base. Last year USTRANSCOM estimated annual procurements of more than \$1.1 billion in commercial services and reported deliveries of more than 97 million square feet of combat vehicles, equipment, and supplies to Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy warfighters engaged in worldwide operations since September 11, 2001.³⁷ But the results of this research warrant that USTRANSCOM should not always consider a commercial first use approach for vessel selection in support of Hawaii based BCT-sized moves.

Rather, an MSC organic solution would prove more prudent and beneficial based not only on the DoD cost efficiencies gained but in providing balance to compensate for the limitations and constraints placed on the modular force in this region. In the end, this sealift solution will not cause any detrimental business loss to our commercial partners' billion dollar enterprise and allow the modular force to train as it would fight during all future training and real world deployments.

Endnotes

¹ The Joint Staff, *Sealift Support to Joint Operations*, version 4-01.2, (Washington D.C.: August 2005), Chapter I, I-1.

² U.S. Transportation Command Home Page, available from <http://www.transcom.mil/organization.cfm>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008.

³ Military Sealift Command, *LMSR Fact Sheet*, available from <http://www.msc.navy.mil/N00P/Savannah/fact-lmsr.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, Military Operations, Concept for Modularity, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-68 (Fort Monroe, VA, 10 January 1995), 1, available from <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-68.doc> accessed 31 Oct 2007.

⁷ For background on TF Hawk, see Alan vick, et al, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options*, RAND Study, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), page 80.

⁸ James Jay Carafano, "The Army Goes Rolling Along: New Service Transformation Agenda Suggests Promise and Problems," *Heritage Foundation*, Feb. 23, 2004, p. 5.

⁹ "Stryker Brigade Combat Team," *GlobalSecurity.org*, updated May 19, 2004, [<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm>].

¹⁰ James Jay Carafano, p. 6.

¹¹ Honorable Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, *Our Army at War - Relevant and Ready.... Today and Tomorrow: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2005*, Posture Statement presented to the 109th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2005), 8.

¹² As of December 2006, the Army had completed the conversion of 31 brigades into BCTs, and is currently in the process of converting 20 more, including 16 Army National Guard brigades. For more information on modular conversions see Honorable Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, *A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2007*, Posture Statement presented to the 110th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007), vi.

¹³ David Hervert, "U.S. Army Force Structure," briefing slides, USAFMSA, 17 August 2007.

¹⁴ Global Security Home Page, available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/schofield-barracks.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2007.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ In 2004, the 163rd Detachment out of Bishop Point near Pearl Harbor provided transportation support to 25th ID units that required the movement of cargo to PTA. The 25th ID also used Young Brothers, Ltd. for inter-island ammunition and cargo movement to PTA when LSV support was not available.

¹⁷ In October 2006, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Army violated national environmental laws by not considering other locations outside Hawaii for the 25th ID Stryker unit that includes 3,900 soldiers and 328 vehicles. The court imposed a temporary injunction, halting construction and training projects for the brigade, until the Army conducts a new environmental impact statement, which was estimated to take up to two years. For additional background on this ruling see the Environment News Service Home Page, "*Court Orders Army to Halt Stryker Development in Hawaii*," <http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/oct2006/2006-10-30-09.asp>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2008.

¹⁸ Military Sealift Command Home Page, available from <http://www.msc.navy.mil/>; Internet; accessed 14 December 2007.

¹⁹ Received MSC vessel inventory listing from SDDC at Fort Eustis, VA on 1 December 2007. The report consisted of 27 RRF (RORO) vessels, 11 LMSRs (7 x Bob Hope Class, 2 x Gordon Class, 2 x Shugart/Yano Class), 8 FSS, and 12 commercial (RORO) vessels. The report also listed the 9 LMSRs (Watson Class) dedicated for APS/MPS.

²⁰ Global Security Home Page, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/mtmc.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 December 2007.

²¹ Jointly sponsored by MARAD and USTRANSCOM, VISA will provide pre-negotiated contracts, guaranteed access to needed sustainment assets, contracts for capacity and intermodal resources in exchange for cargo business and a tailored sealift force to meet the specific needs of a contingency. It also will permit industry and USTRANSCOM to plan responses together before a contingency begins. For additional background on VISA see the MARAD Home page, VISA, at <http://www.marad.dot.gov/Programs/MSP/visacover.html>.

²² Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] Federal Register: May 5, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 87), page 25166-25168, available from <http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/04-10202.htm>; accessed 14 December 2007.

²³ Marvin Benoit, Fort Eustis, VA SDDC Operations Officer, e-mail message to author, 1 December 2007 containing current *USTRANSCOM Surge Sealift and Commercial Vessel Selection SOP*, dated 31 May 07.

²⁴ The 25th ID DTO and G-8 had determined that the Division was within the 6 million dollar budget for NTC. Cost estimates for the movement of cargo for the 2006 NTC rotation were derived by the DTO through coordination with the 599th SDDC and use of the Single Mobility System (SMS). SMS is a web-based computer system that provides visibility of air, sea, and land transportation assets and provides aggregated reporting of cargo and passenger movements. This system also has planning tools that provide shipping estimates at FY SDDC rate value. Thw website can be found at <https://sms.transcom.mil/sms-perl/SeaCost.pl>

- MSC vessel cost for 25 days at \$70,000 per day for a LMSR. This allowed prestaging of the vessel from the west coast of the United States. SDDC / FISC costs were estimated at about \$700 - \$750 per TEU to cover their overhead and handling fees. An estimated 1100 TEUs were figured for the move to NTC (the theory was based on two trailers equals a TEU, three TRICONS equals a TEU...). Total cost for this estimate was \$2.575M one way or \$5.1M.

Or

- The SMS calculator using 1100 TEU at 31,900 MTONs provided an estimate of \$2.480M each way or \$4.96M roundtrip.

- The line haul cost were provided by NTC ITO personnel. 25th ID received two price quotes \$450 and \$650 and used the highest price. To line haul approx 1700 pieces of equipment (1755 minus A/C) the DTO estimated about 525 forty eight foot tractor trailers (7 TRICONS per trailer or two HMMWVs and a trailer). This equates to 341,250 each way or a total of approximately \$682,500. The G8 budgeted for \$700,000 in linehaul costs for the rotation.

- The DTO and ITO also looked at several commercial comparisons to determine the above sealift budget's validity in the event commercial industry was used:

1. Flat rate of \$69,987/day (roughly \$70,000) for MSC chartered vessel would be comparable to commercial rate.
2. Commercial movement of a POV from Hawaii to LA is about \$800 - \$1000. (1100 TEUs at this rate is well under estimate).
3. The cost estimate for the 12 x UH60 A/C to move from San Diego on the Pasha vessel in Jan was \$17,000 (58 A/C for this move seemed within above budget).

²⁵ The author served as the Division G4 for 25th ID during the planning and execution of NTC Rotation 06-06. The events captured in this timeline were based on an e-mail provided to the 25th ID COS on 29 March 2007.

²⁶ The Division did not want to disassemble the CH-47s below standard sealift configuration. In order to meet height restrictions on the commercial vessels offered by SDDC, the only way to make them fit would require tearing the pylons off the CH-47s to reduce the

height down to 141 inches. This would also require an estimated two additional weeks of work at the SPOD for reassembly and to prepare the aircraft for the NTC rotation.

²⁷ The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-664), as amended, applies to the requirement that at least 50% of the gross tonnage of U.S. government-impelled cargo be transported on U.S. flagged vessels in commercial shipping lanes. Therefore, any of the MSC-chartered vessels (to include the LMSR requested by the 25th ID) would not have been in violation of this Act. For additional background on the cargo preference Act see the MARAD Home Page at <http://www.marad.dot.gov/offices/cargo/CivilianAgenciesSection.htm>.

²⁸ Marvin Benoit, Fort Eustis, VA SDDC Operations Officer, e-mail message to author, 1 December 2007.

²⁹ Commercial industry required the unit to follow HAZMAT procedures different from those for which they had planned. MATSON commercial liners containerized all rolling stock in unit motor pools and subsequently line-hauled the containers to port for loading operations. Their policy stipulated that all hazardous materiel (notably fire extinguishers) were to be segregated from the vehicle being containerized and placed in a wooden crate (accompanied by a DD FORM 2890, DD FORM 836 and Materiel Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and containerized separately).

³⁰ Required by SDDC in requesting export traffic releases for shipment via commercial ocean carrier. Export Traffic Release Reports (ETRRs) are not required by the supported unit when moving cargo on MSC organic vessels. For additional background on ETRRs go to the SDDC web site at <https://www.sddc.army.mil>.

³¹ Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Pearl Harbor provides supplies and logistics support services to Naval and other military operating forces and supporting commands in the mid-Pacific region. For additional background on FISC, Pearl Harbor go to https://www.navsup.navy.mil/portal/page?_pageid=477,265071,477_265088&_dad=p5star&_schema=P5STAR.

³² Peter Pappalardo, FISC – Pearl Harbor Operations, e-mail message to author, 11 December 2007.

³³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Transportation and Traffic Management*, DOD Directive 4500.9E (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 11 September 2007), 3.

³⁴ Inspector General Department of Defense, *United States Transportation Command Compliance with DoD Policy on the Use of Commercial Sealift*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 21 June 2007), Report Number D-2007-105, 4.

³⁵ Ibid, 2.

³⁶ Enacted as Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the Jones Act reserves domestic deep-sea, Great Lakes and inland waters commerce for merchant vessels owned, built, flagged and crewed in the United States. Interestingly, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff temporarily waived the Jones Act for foreign vessels carrying oil and Natural gas from September 1 to 19, 2005. This is a very uncommon occurrence. For further information on the Jones Act see the December 2005 edition of The

American Maritime Officer, Volume 35, Number 12 (website, <http://www.amo-union.org/newspaper/morgue/12-2005/sections/AMO-DECEMBER.pdf>).

³⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *U.S. Transportation Command 2007 Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, USTRANSCOM, 2007), 10.